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Abstract: Civil society has exploded in Latin America as democratization 
has continued over the last 30 years. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are 
thought to improve governance and oversight and to increase social capital. 
Nonetheless, we have limited knowledge about what motivates CSOs’ politi-
cal strategies, which include participating in formal political institutions, 
attending demonstrations, and providing services. We build knowledge here 
by evaluating data from a unique survey of nine hundred CSOs across seven 
Brazilian cities. Our findings showcase several parallel processes: poorer 
CSOs continue to rely on the state and actively participate in political pro-
cesses despite protesting at greater rates than wealthier CSOs; therefore, we 
contend that institutional and political process arguments better explain 
poorer CSOs’ behavior. We also argue that relatively wealthy CSOs’ disen-
gagement reflects greater resource mobilization, more professionalization, 
and an increase in social capital. Our results show that multilayered explana-
tions improve our understanding of CSO behavior and state-society rela-
tions in Brazil and Latin America. 
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1 Introduction  
The ongoing mobilization of citizens and civil society organizations 
(CSOs) profoundly marks national and local politics across Latin Ameri-
ca and the developing world. In the twenty-first century, citizens and 
CSOs) now have access to an expanded repertoire of political activities 
that they can employ to influence public officials, private corporations, 
and their fellow citizens (Oxhorn 2011). These political activities include 
protesting and engaging in contentious politics; being involved in cam-
paigns and elections, party politics, and clientelistic exchanges; forming 
community organizations; lobbying government officials; and working 
within incremental policy-making decisions (Escobar and Álvarez 1992; 
Fox 2007; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
2003; Abers and Keck 2013; Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager 2005). 
Citizens and CSOs are now able to link themselves to each other and to 
a wider array of organizations by taking advantage of new democratic 
institutions, the partial protection of basic liberties, expanded educational 
opportunities, and decreased transportation and communication costs 
(Avritzer 2002 and 2009; Pires 2011). Citizens form and join CSOs to 
advance both narrow and broad interests, from improving public securi-
ty to challenging extractive industries to installing infrastructure in their 
respective streets to improving basic education and health care (Jacobi 
1989).  
In this article, we ask how CSOs engage the state, public officials, 
and new democratic institutions. We draw from an original survey of 863 
CSO leaders across seven Brazilian cities to evaluate three distinct strate-
gies: engaging in contentious politics, entering into direct contact with 
public officials (elected and civil servants), and participating directly in 
participatory policy-making institutions. The data we use in this article 
enables us to better explain why certain CSOs are likely to pursue specif-
ic strategies. This in turn provides us with a window into the broader 
issue of how Brazilian state-society relations are being reconstituted as a 
result of the civil liberty protections often afforded to protestors, the 
expansion of contracting and outsourcing, and the implementation of a 
wide architecture of participatory institutions.  
We employ a pluralistic and expansive understanding of civil socie-
ty, which we define as the sphere of social and political associational 
activity separate from the state, the market, and the family (Cohen and 
Arato 1992). Jeffrey Alexander argues that “civil society is a sphere of 
solidarity in which individual rights and collective obligations are tensely 
intertwined” (Alexander 2006: 53). “Bonds of solidarity” thus help orga-
nized groups to forge ongoing alliances in order to pressure government 
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officials, public and private corporations, and their fellow citizens in 
pursuit of their political and policy goals. “Civil society organization” is 
an umbrella concept that incorporates a wide range of collective groups; 
social movements, community-based organizations, and “third-sector” 
organizations are all prominent within this category. These organizations 
have diverse sets of interests – organizing communities and potential 
allies, establishing a coherent political and policy agenda, and working to 
achieve social change (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). The um-
brella concept of the CSO allows us to recognize the diversity of organi-
zational type and interest as well as explain strategic choices in each area. 
Three interrelated political processes now frame civil society organ-
izing in Brazil. First, the return of representative democracy in the mid-
1980s and the subsequent extension of basic protections permitted many 
CSOs to engage in contentious political activity.1 Second, the expansion 
of participatory institutions now allows CSOs to have unprecedented 
contact with public officials as well as their fellow CSO leaders in public 
policy-making processes. Third, Brazil moved toward a neodevelopmen-
talist state and invested much more heavily in social welfare policies 
during the country’s economic expansion between 2000 and 2009 (Sugi-
yama 2012; Montero 2014). These political processes influence CSOs’ 
political and organizational opportunities and, in turn, the strategies they 
use to pursue their interests. 
Our analysis reflects two distinct types of CSO activities. First, 
“community-based” CSOs from poorer cities – whose leaders have low-
er socioeconomic status (SES – as measured by income, level of formal 
education, and race) and do not hold government contracts to provide 
social services – are most likely to engage the state through direct contact 
with public officials, be involved in participatory institutions, and use 
contentious protest. It is noteworthy that CSOs from the poorest com-
munities engage in a wide range of political activities. Surprisingly, they 
also appear to have a more diverse set of political strategies than CSOs 
from wealthier cities and those with leaders that have higher SES. We 
argue that the renewal of civil society, the creation of a new party system, 
and the establishment of new democratic institutions explain why rela-
tively resource-poor organizations are now using a diverse set of strate-
gies (Heller 2012; Sandbrook et al. 2007). 
Second, third-sector CSOs in relatively wealthy cities – whose lead-
ers have relatively high SES and hold government contracts to provide 
1  Of course, we must bear in mind that rights protection varies across regional, 
state, municipal, and class lines in Brazil and that rights are not fully guaranteed 
in many circumstances.  
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social services – are less engaged with participatory institutions, have 
limited formal contacts with public officials, and eschew protest activi-
ties. These organizations meet the profile of third-sector associations, 
which typically provide social services through government contracts 
(Bresser-Pereira and Spink 1998; Bresser-Pereira and Grau 1999; Lavalle, 
Acharya, and Houtzager 2005). Third-sector CSOs tend to be nonparti-
san but often leverage their professional and technical know-how to 
shape and implement public policies. We anticipate the leaders of these 
organizations will be able to use preexisting networks (e.g., they went to 
the same high school or university) to engage public officials and to 
mobilize resources.  
The broad field of “social movements” includes many smaller or-
ganizations that work toward similar goals. Thus there may be, writ large, 
a health “movement” or a housing “movement” that is comprised of 
many CSOs. Although CSOs in such movements may come together for 
specific public demonstrations or strategic planning, they have their own 
political and policy agendas at the local level. CSOs themselves can also 
include a range of organizational types, such as community-based organ-
izations, service-providers, national organizations, and/or advocacy think 
tanks. Our challenge is to identify these CSOs and explain their strategic 
choices, given the increasing number of options at CSOs’ disposal in 
Brazil.  
We draw from an original survey of 863 CSO leaders across seven 
Brazilian cities to create a series of statistical models of CSO activities. 
We find that the combination of three factors most accurately explains 
CSOs’ political/policy strategies. First, at the macrolevel, the wealth of 
the city influences CSOs’ strategies. Wealthier cities have greater levels of 
public resources to spend on social service contracts, a broader middle 
class, and a more robust administrative structure to support the prolif-
eration of participatory institutions. The results of our regression anal-
yses indicate the wealth of the city has a significant effect on the strategic 
actions CSOs take.  
Second, at the individual level, we find that CSO leaders’ socioeco-
nomic status also significantly affects CSOs’ strategies. In our models we 
use household income as our proxy for socioeconomic status and our 
central individual-level explanatory variable.2 Thus, the individual charac-
teristics of CSO leaders are important because of the leaders’ formal and 
2  Household income is highly correlated with education level (0.86) and race 
(0.81). 
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professional training, their personal networks, and the intangible aspects 
of social status that are related to power in Brazil.  
Third, at the mesolevel, we examine whether CSOs hold a contract 
to deliver state services. This is a mesolevel factor because it implies that 
CSOs are (a) formally registered with the state, (b) have the infrastruc-
ture and skills to provide social services, and (c) have political leaderships 
that can secure government contracts. It thus falls between the individual 
characteristics of CSO leadership at the microlevel and city wealth at the 
macrolevel. The results of our regression analysis show that holding a 
government contract also has a significant effect on CSOs’ strategic 
actions. 
Table 1 captures distinct patterns of CSOs’ political and policy ac-
tivities. We find that the level of wealth in a CSO’s city, the level of 
wealth of a CSO’s leadership, and whether a CSO has a government 
service-delivery contract are strongly associated with a CSO’s political 
strategy.3 The final column in Table 1 classifies the type of organizations 
associated with each political strategy. 
In this article we show how the protections provided by the reestab-
lishment of democratic rule, the creation of participatory institutions, 
and the expansion of the welfare state best explain why CSOs select 
specific political activities to pursue their political interests. These theo-
retical frameworks map onto the micro-, meso-, and macrolevel causal 
mechanisms we identify as crucial for explaining CSO behavior based on 
variation in the CSOs and the sociopolitical context in which they oper-
ate. Although this article focuses on seven Brazilian cities, we argue that 
our approach is sufficiently broad that our insights can be applied to 
patterns of political organizing across the region.  
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we briefly describe the expan-
sion and changes to Brazil’s civil society during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Second, we focus on the changes in the political opportunities and insti-
tutional structures that altered the terrain of civil society organizing. 
Third, we present the Brazilian context, discuss our data, and describe 
the strategies we use to analyze our data. Fourth, we report and discuss 
our results with respect to broad debates in the field. 
3  It is important to note that the cities included in the survey do not represent 
the poorest parts of the country. The cities in our sample are not representative 
of the largest cities in the country either.  
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Table 1:  Brazilian Civil Society Organizations’ Characteristics, Strategies, 
and Type 
 CSO Charac-
teristics 
Informal 
contact with 
public 
officials 
Participation 
in formal 
policy-
making 
processes 
Involve-
ment in 
Protest 
Politics 
Type 
 Leaders have 
High SES,  
NO contracts 
8 
(Lowest) 
8 
(Lowest) 
7 
(Low) 
Religious, Social, 
Rights-based 
 Leaders have 
High SES, 
Active con-
tract 
6 
(Middle) 
7 
(Low) 
8 
(Lowest) Third Sector 
W
ea
lth
ier
 
Ci
tie
s Leaders have 
Low SES, 
NO contracts 
7 
(Low) 
2 
(High) 
2 
(High) 
Community-
based, Politically 
disconnected 
 Leaders have 
Low SES,  
Active con-
tract 
4 
(Middle) 
6 
(Middle) 
5 
(Middle) 
Community-
based, Politically 
connected 
 Leaders have 
high SES,  
NO contracts 
5 
(Middle) 
3 
(High) 
4 
(Middle) 
Religious, Social, 
Rights-based 
 Leaders have 
high SES, 
Active con-
tract 
1 
(Highest) 
5 
(Middle) 
6 
(Middle) Third Sector 
Po
or
er
 
Ci
tie
s Leaders have 
low SES  
NO contracts 
3 
(High) 
1 
(Highest) 
1 
(Highest) 
Community-
based, Politically 
disconnected 
 Leaders have 
Low SES: 
Active con-
tract 
2 
(High) 
4 
(Middle) 
3 
(High) 
Community-
based, Politically 
connected 
Note:  The relative positions of CSOs in each column are based on cross-tabulation 
of frequencies for each set of CSO characteristics and the strategies CSOs 
pursue. We then rank CSOs possessing one of the eight possible combina-
tions of character traits against each other according to how much they pursue 
each political strategy. The result is a 1–8 ranking for each strategy relative to 
other CSOs with different characteristics.  
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
2 Setting the Stage 
Four interrelated processes best explain the heterogeneity of Brazil’s civil 
society today: (i) the renewal of civil society during the 1970s and 1980s; 
(ii) the creation of a new party system, especially the predominance of 
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two reform-oriented parties (the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalha-
dores – PT) and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social 
Democracia Brasileira – PSDB)) at the center of presidential contests; 
(iii) the establishment of a new democratic architecture; and (iv) the 
expansion of social policy provisions in the years 2000–2009, which 
followed the economic stabilization of the 1990s (Kinzo 1996). 
First, the renewal of civil society during the 1970s and 1980s ush-
ered in new ways of conducting politics (Dagnino 1994 and 1998; Av-
ritzer 2002; Dagnino and Tatagiba 2007). Specifically, the growth of new 
social movements and new forms of labor organizing contributed to new 
forms of engagement (Álvarez 1990; Avritzer 2002). For example, the 
liberation theology movement and Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy influ-
enced citizens to organize around demands for civil, political, and social 
rights. Citizens also began to use democratic procedures within their 
organizations, including deliberative processes and elections. The expan-
sion of civil society also fostered the creation of new political alliances 
and groups. These alliances potentially circumvented the clientelistic 
relationships of the past and offered groups new opportunities to pursue 
their interests. Furthermore, the increasing density and diversity of civil 
society allowed these groups to engage public officials in unprecedented 
ways (Avritzer 2002; Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Wolford 2010). 
Second, the creation of a new party system, especially the growth of 
two reformist political parties (the PT and the PSDB), was directly rele-
vant in generating new forms of participation and engagement (Keck 
1992; Hunter 2010). The PT not only built itself on the infrastructure of 
new social movements and labor organizations but also linked itself to 
progressive sectors of the middle class, thus incorporating new interests 
into the PT coalition. The PSDB grew out of the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro – MDB) and the Brazili-
an Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático 
Brasileiro – PMDB) (political parties formed in opposition to the military 
dictatorship) and its original political base consisted of São Paulo’s mid-
dle classes. Thus, the two dominant political parties created in postdicta-
torship Brazil (occupying the presidency from 1994–2014) emerged from 
an effort to reform the basic political and social institutions that govern 
the country.4  
4  Of course, both parties have changed their positions since the mid-1990s. The 
PSDB established the highly successful economic growth model, and the PT 
changed its position to be closer to the PSDB model while still focusing on so-
cial policies and redistribution. 
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Third, Brazil’s establishment of a new constitutional order dramati-
cally increased the number of citizens formally engaged with the state 
(Avritzer 2009; Abers and Keck 2009). Brazil’s 1988 Constitution is a 
broad, sweeping document that includes a wide range of rights and a 
new distribution of authority. It offered concessions to conservative 
political groups (Hagopian 1996) as well as to newly organized civil soci-
ety groups (Avritzer 2002). The 1988 Constitution introduced two spe-
cific changes that are pertinent to our research: First, it mandated an 
extensive municipalization of authority and resources. Second, the legis-
lation that accompanied the new constitution required municipalities to 
establish specific types of participatory institutions and permitted local 
governments to experiment with other new forms of participation. As a 
result, the surface area of the state broadened, thus allowing citizens a 
greater number of entry points into the state (Heller and Evans 2011).  
Fourth, Brazil’s economic stabilization during the 1990s and subse-
quent economic expansion during 2000–2009 made new revenues avail-
able and allowed the government to increase overall spending levels. 
Elected officials at the federal and subnational levels also used these new 
resources to expand social-service delivery. Some of the results of this 
shift have been a real reduction in extreme poverty, a broadening of the 
working class, and an increase in access to basic consumer goods (World 
Bank 2014; UNDP 2010 and 2013). While income and asset inequality 
remain quite high, economic expansion increased the middle class’s ab-
solute wealth and created a much larger working class. Relevant to our 
argument here is that economic growth created a group of professional-
ized CSOs, which are led by individuals with much-higher-than-average 
income and education levels and represent relatively wealthy constituen-
cies. 
3 Organizing under a Democratic, Social 
Welfare State 
Citizens and civil society organizations, as the political opportunity litera-
ture on social movements has shown, modify their strategies in response 
to changes in the social, political, or institutional environment (McAdam, 
McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tilly 2004). Tarrow argues that  
differences in patterns of state building produced differences in 
the opportunity structures of social movements […]. Tocqueville’s 
underlying message was that state-building creates an opportunity 
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structure for collective action of which ordinary people take ad-
vantage (Tarrow 1998: 55–56).  
We argue that the reestablishment of representative democracy, the im-
plementation of new participatory institutions, and the expansion of 
social-service spending altered the opportunity structure for political 
engagement, thus inducing CSOs to utilize a wide range of activities in 
pursuit of their political and policy goals. 
The first analytical pillar of our argument is that the return to repre-
sentative democracy was accompanied by an increased protection of 
basic civil liberties, including the right to hold public demonstrations. 
Political protest is an integral part of political organizing in Brazil as 
excluded groups have traditionally used contentious politics as a way to 
place their interests on the public agenda (Álvarez 1990; Escobar and 
Álvarez 1992; Wampler 2007). As a result, an increase in public demon-
strations following the democratic transition is not surprising, because 
contentious politics often accompany democratic state building. In this 
sense, democracy frees ordinary citizens to use disruptive, direct action 
to ensure public officials and their fellow citizens hear protesters’ de-
mands (Tarrow 1998). Politically marginalized citizens have long used 
contentious politics to expand their rights, gain the attention of public 
officials and their fellow citizens, and access scarce public resources. 
Extensive use of contentious politics allowed new political coalitions to 
develop, pushed new leaders into the centers of political power, and 
highlighted the ability of outside groups to successfully promote signifi-
cant institutional reform during recent transitions to and the establish-
ment of democratic regimes during the 1980s, the 1990s, and the period 
2000–2009 (Yashar 2005; Baiocchi 2005; Grindle 2002; Wampler and 
Avritzer 2004; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011).5  
The second analytical pillar of our argument is that new democratic 
institutions are part of a larger democratic state-building effort designed 
to overcome perceived deficiencies with representative democracy such 
as passive voters with little information, the lack of accountability among 
elected officials, a limited public sphere, and misallocations of scarce 
public resources (Avritzer 2002; Stepan 1989; Castañeda 1993; O’Don-
5  The ability of citizens and CSOs to exercise these rights still varies widely 
across the country as well as among different socioeconomic classes (Abers and 
Keck 2013; Hochstetler and Keck 2007). Wealthier middle-class individuals 
holding demonstrations in central areas of large cities have greater protection 
than poorer citizens organizing protests far away from media outlets (Arias 
2009). Nevertheless, Brazilian protesters are generally better protected under 
the democratic regime than they were prior to the transition. 
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nell 1994; Fung and Wright 2003; Wampler 2007; Barczak 2001; Pate-
man 1970 and 2012). Specifically, participatory institutions are designed 
to enhance the quality of democracy and improve the basic delivery of 
public goods to those groups historically excluded from all but the most 
minimal levels of state resources (Touchton and Wampler 2014). The 
establishment of participatory democracy is best conceptualized as a new 
moment of democratic state building, whereby intermediary bodies are 
established to further decentralize where, when, and by whom binding 
decisions are made. 
Democratic state-building through participatory institutions is not 
uniform across Latin America or within each country due to the frag-
mentation of local and national states’ capacities, the diversity of rules 
that guide participatory institutions, the repertories of strategies available 
to CSOs, and elected officials’ interests (Goldfrank 2007; Migdal 2001; 
Scott 1998; Van Cott 2008; Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Wampler 2007; 
Fedozzi 2001).  
In Brazil the three most common participatory institutions include 
the widely established public policy management councils (conselhos), 
policy conferences (confêrencias), and participatory budgeting (orçamento 
participativo). There are now at least 65,000 municipal-level councils and 
hundreds of thousands of elected citizens that participate in these coun-
cils (Victora et al. 2011). One-quarter of medium-sized and large munici-
palities continue to use participatory budgeting as a policy-making and 
democratic tool. Presidents Lula and Dilma invested heavily in the na-
tional conference system, inducing more than 6 million people to partic-
ipate over the past decade. 
Table 2:  Participatory Institutions in Brazil 
 Numbers Participants Voice Vote Key authority 
Participatory 
Budgeting 
100+ mid-
sized and large 
municipalities 
Hundreds of 
thousands 
citizens en-
gaged 
Yes Yes Focus on 
public works 
Public Policy 
Management 
Councils 
65,000 coun-
cils 
Hundreds of 
thousands 
citizens elected 
to office 
Yes Yes Monitor 
government 
programs 
National 
conferences 
74 confer-
ences since 
2002 
6 million over 
past decade 
Yes Partial-
Broad 
topics 
Propose 
general policy 
guidelines 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
The establishment of participatory governance is now transforming 
when, where, and how contentious politics can be used, thereby encour-
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aging us to modify Tarrow’s definition of how contentious politics de-
velop.  
Collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people 
who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or 
unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally 
challenge others or authorities (Tarrow 1998: 3. Italics added).  
Although participatory institutions now provide regular institutional 
access for large numbers of Brazilians, the Brazilian masses continue to 
use contentious politics as part of their political engagement repertory. 
This suggests that while regular access to participatory institutions in-
creases the political opportunities available to citizens, it does not re-
move customary avenues of engagement. 
The third analytical pillar of our argument is that Brazil’s return to a 
neodevelopmentalist state was accompanied by an expansion of the 
social welfare state (Montero 2014; Sugiyama 2012). Federal, state, and 
municipal governments greatly expanded the number of social contracts 
they were able to provide. For many Brazilian CSOs, their mantra during 
the 1970s and 1980s was “autonomy,” which reflected CSOs’ efforts to 
maintain a healthy distance between themselves and public officials. 
Importantly, the overarching theme shifted to “partnership” or “cogov-
ernance” during the first and second decades of the twenty-first century 
as CSOs sought to align themselves with the state and elected govern-
ments in order to secure public contracts. 
In terms of accessing state contracts, middle-class CSO leaders have 
policy and personnel networks as well as professional skills that allow 
them to gain access to the expanded public resources. Thus, a combina-
tion of meritocracy (expert knowledge), know-how (ability to provide 
services and to “win” complex service-delivery contracts), and personnel 
networks (ties to political appointees, elected officials, and high-level civil 
servants) permits these CSOs to gain access to resources that sustain 
their organizations.  
Conversely, social movements and CSOs whose leaders have lower 
SES must pursue a much more overtly politicized set of strategies in 
order to secure funding. These CSO leaders often lack professional skills, 
but instead have access to elected officials and to the poor. These CSOs 
are also more likely to be susceptible to co-optation because they are 
much more economically insecure than middle-class organizations. 
In sum, Brazil’s current democratic regime induces civil society 
leaders to play multiple formal and informal roles, acting as legislative 
aides, campaign workers, service delivery providers, party activists, elect-
ed representatives in participatory institutions, and community organiz-
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ers. The boundaries between these roles are fluid, which means that in 
some venues community leaders represent the state; in other venues, a 
political party; and in others, the interests of their community organiza-
tions or social movements. There is now a blurring of the interests CSO 
leaders purportedly represent in any given venue, which is why it is vital 
to study cogovernance venues as one institutional process embedded in 
broader economic and political contexts. Within democratic regimes, 
especially when there are competitive local elections, the cooperation of 
CSOs and public officials is widespread, making it necessary to concep-
tualize contentious politics as one political tool in a broader repertoire of 
political strategies employed by CSOs to pursue their political, policy, 
and organizing goals.  
4 What Explains Connections between the 
State and Civil Society? 
We administered a survey to CSO leaders in seven Brazilian municipali-
ties in 2009 and 2010 to collect data on the connections between the 
state and civil society.6 One of the cities selected, Belo Horizonte, is the 
state capital of Minas Gerais and has a population of roughly 2.5 million 
residents. The other six cities are midsized, with populations between 
100,000 and 250,000 people. We opted to study a greater number of 
midsized cities because we know much less about the interactions be-
tween the state and civil society there than we know about those in the 
large capital cities. These cities include Juiz De Fora, Lages, Montes 
Claros, Sorocaba, Uberlândia, and Vitória Da Conquista. We limited our 
sample to one southern city (Lages), one city in the state of São Paulo 
(Sorocaba), one city in the state of Bahia (Vitória Da Conquista), and 
three cities from the state of Minas Gerais (Juiz De Fora, Montes Claros, 
Uberlândia). We selected these specific cities because they exhibit con-
siderable variation based on wealth, regional and state politics, local party 
system, and the configuration of civil society. We argue this variation 
increases the chances that any relationships we find in the data using all 
6  Dr. Brian Wampler worked with Dr. Leonardo Avritzer (Federal University of 
Minas Gerais) to administer this survey. Financial support to administer the 
survey came from multiple sources, including the Federal University of Minas 
Gerais, Boise State University, the Civil Society Consortium of the University 
of Massachusetts, and the Research Foundation of the State of Minas Gerais 
(FAPEMIG). 
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seven of these cities will reflect the average experience of many similar 
Brazilian municipalities.  
Our survey captures civil society leaders’ activities and attitudes. 
These leaders are the crucial conduits linking the state to citizens and 
CSOs in each city. First, we obtained each city’s lists of registered organ-
izations. Then we contacted each organization and surveyed its president 
or another leader. The sample is comprised entirely of CSO leaders who 
are engaged in participatory organizations or civil society organizations 
that register with the municipal government to remain eligible for state 
contracts (convenios).7 Our survey population thus includes a wide variety 
of professional organizations as well as local voluntary associations.  
The survey asks questions about the structure of the CSO, its con-
nection to the state, its connection to civil society, and the demographics 
of its leadership. For example, the survey requests information regarding 
whether the CSO elects or appoints its leaders, whether they have a 
contract to provide services with an outside organization (e.g., the state, 
a private firm, another nonprofit), how frequently the CSO meets. We 
also ask questions concerning the frequency with which the CSO has 
contact with local government representatives and participatory demo-
cratic institutions and about what activities the CSO pursues (e.g., street 
protests, council meeting attendance). A total of 863 CSO activists re-
sponded to the survey in our seven-city sample. The resulting database 
represents one of the largest, broadest cross-sectional surveys of CSOs 
in Latin America and therefore offers unique opportunities to test hy-
potheses and examine the conventional wisdom surrounding state–civil 
society relations.  
We specify seven logit models with standard errors clustered on the 
city to explain CSOs’ connection with the state and the form of political 
participation they use to pursue their interests. In each case we present 
the dependent variable from each set of models, discuss the independent 
variables and our specific hypotheses connecting them to the dependent 
variable, and then present the estimation results for each individual mod-
el. We report the raw coefficients for relationships between the inde-
7  In each city we contacted the municipal government to secure lists of CSOs 
formally registered with the municipal state. CSOs are registered with the dif-
ferent public policy councils, the policy conferences, and with specific depart-
ments. We attempted to contact approximately 1,200 CSOs from all seven cit-
ies. We then surveyed all 863 CSOs that responded to our initial contact. In 
five of the seven cities, we employed student research assistants to administer 
surveys to CSO leaders in person in the leaders’ respective neighborhoods. We 
administered the survey via telephone in Belo Horizonte and Lages. 
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pendent and dependent variable and include the odds ratio for each 
variable in the Technical Appendix (see Tables 3a–7a). We construct the 
first set of models to answer questions about whether CSOs have con-
tact with municipal councils, legislative assemblies, and/or members of 
the mayor’s cabinet. 
4.1 Dependent Variable 1: Contact with the State 
Our data captures the range of contact CSOs had with municipal, state, 
and federal institutions in the form of participatory democratic institu-
tions, the municipal legislative council, the state legislature, and the 
mayor’s office for the two months prior to responding to the survey. We 
use the responses to generate four dichotomous variables with scores of 
1 indicating that participation or contact has occurred and 0 indicating 
that it has not. Out of the entire sample, 77 percent of CSOs attended 
participatory council meetings, 65 percent attended national conferences, 
48 percent contacted the municipal legislature, and 63 percent contacted 
the mayor’s office.  
We use CSO leaders’ formal participation in state institutions and 
informal contact with different government officials to measure overall 
engagement between the state and civil society. Explaining the frequency 
with which CSO leaders participate in formal policy-making bodies and 
contact different branches of the state can help us understand the moti-
vation behind CSO activities and also provides an indication of the cur-
rent configuration of state–civil society relations in Brazil.  
4.2 Key Independent Variable: The City’s Wealth  
We first want to know whether a city’s wealth accounts for CSOs’ politi-
cal activities. We hypothesize that CSOs in relatively wealthy cities are 
likely to engage the state less than CSOs in relatively poor cities, thus 
revealing a wealth dimension to clientelistic exchanges. For instance, 
CSOs in poorer municipalities rely on state institutions and public and 
party officials to secure scarce resources in order to help their communi-
ty members get access to basic services. In contrast, CSOs in wealthy 
municipalities have more resources, are more professionalized, and have 
more connections with civil society than in poorer cities. They will there-
fore find it less necessary to rely on the state for support. Though state 
support may offer benefits, it may also carry a cost that CSOs in wealthi-
er cities do not need to pay.  
We use the log of each municipality’s local GDP/capita as the first 
proxy for access to resources. We recognize, however, that this is an 
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incomplete proxy for the wealth of a CSO’s membership or the re-
sources CSOs themselves might have. Brazilian cities feature populations 
representing diverse economic experiences. Wealthy cities contain many 
poor neighborhoods and poor cities contain wealthy neighborhoods. 
Accounting for the particular submunicipal context in which a CSO 
operates is important to assess whether a CSO’s relative wealth impacts 
its behavior. We therefore use the household income of the survey re-
spondents as an additional proxy for our CSOs’ economic contexts. 
Although this measure provides more refined information about CSOs’ 
submunicipal economic environments, it still requires two different as-
sumptions about the CSO leaders’ household incomes. First, we assume 
that leaders with higher incomes are associated with “professional” or 
third-sector NGOs and thus work on behalf of an issue or community 
without necessarily being a potential recipient of the public good. Sec-
ond, we assume that low-income respondents are working with a “com-
munity-based organization” in which they seek to secure public goods 
that would directly benefit their communities. 
4.3 Key Independent Variable:  
The CSO Administrator’s Household Income
We collect data on the monthly household income of each CSO adminis-
trator that responded to our surveys. This variable takes on the values of 
different salary bands corresponding to the following monthly household 
income levels: (1) up to USD 250, (2) USD 251 to USD 500, (3) USD 
501 to USD 1,000, (4) USD 1,001 to USD 1,750, (5) USD 1,751 to USD 
2,650, and (6) above USD 2,651. Our data show that 16 percent fall 
within salary band 1; 22 percent, in band 2; 34 percent, in band 3; 12 
percent, in band 4; 8 percent, in band 5; and 8 percent, in band 6. 
4.4 Control Variables 
The Mayor’s Party: New forms of democratic participation and the 
strengthening of civil society have been the centerpiece of the PT’s na-
tional agenda over the last decade. PT mayors and CSOs often share a 
pro-poor bias and are thus likely to cooperate at greater rates, on aver-
age, than CSOs and non-PT mayors. Furthermore, poorer populations 
targeted by CSOs and the PT are almost always disengaged from politics. 
Incorporating the poor and politically disengaged into the city’s policy-
making architecture would theoretically increase the likelihood of poorer 
citizens voting in city elections. These new voters would most likely vote 
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for left-wing parties who propose downward redistribution of city reve-
nue. Conventional wisdom therefore suggests that left-wing mayors 
would champion CSO programs not only because their downwardly 
redistributive, poverty reducing policy platforms are popular with many 
CSOs, but also because they want to bring new left-wing voters to the 
polls.  
In general, we expect PT mayors to have greater opportunities to 
support state-society interaction and CSO engagement than non-PT 
mayors both through resources from the national government and the 
party and through a greater motivation to align with ideological policy. 
We anticipate CSOs in municipalities with PT mayors will have greater 
interaction with the state, will be more likely to elect their leaders than 
CSOs operating in municipalities with non-PT mayors, and will be less 
likely to use protest as a form of political participation. If the “protest” 
part of our assumption is correct, it suggests that the PT’s longtime base 
will change their political strategies when the PT is in power, thus raising 
the likelihood of co-optation. We use a dichotomous variable to test 
whether CSOs in municipalities with PT mayors (coded 1; accounts for 
percent) behave systematically differently from CSOs in municipalities 
with non-PT mayors (coded 0; accounts for 54 percent).  
4.5 Whether CSOs Hold Government Contracts 
We collect data on whether CSOs are contracted to provide services for 
an external entity. This entity is almost always one tier of Brazil’s federal 
system, but it could also be a foreign government, a domestic charitable 
organization, or an international nonprofit – even the Catholic Church.  
We hypothesize that CSOs with state contracts are likely to have 
more interaction with the state due to such contracts. We also think that 
CSOs with government contracts are less likely to protest against the 
state; this may be due to having a contract with the state in some cases, 
but may also be due to the professionalization that comes with having a 
contract to provide services. The direct responsibilities to fulfill contracts 
become relatively more important compared to some of the CSOs’ other 
long-term missions. For example, a contract creates a financial incentive 
to focus on providing services and may not leave time for political pro-
test. Simply put, a contract for service delivery can transform CSOs from 
crusaders into managers. Furthermore, CSOs that receive contracts are 
likely to be the most professionalized and the most focused on service 
delivery and are most likely to pursue their missions through means 
beyond public protests in the first place.  
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We employ a dichotomous variable to ascertain whether CSOs are 
under contract (coded 1; accounts for 46 percent) or not (coded 0; ac-
counts for 54 percent).  
4.6 Whether the CSO Elects its Leadership 
We expect CSOs’ organizational structure to impact their contact with 
the state and their form of political participation. Broadly speaking, some 
CSOs elect their leaders, whereas others appoint them from their mem-
bership. Elected leaders may have different incentives driving their be-
havior than appointed leaders. For example, an elected leader may have a 
strong incentive to mobilize CSO membership for a protest because 
public protest is a highly visible way to demonstrate a leader’s commit-
ment to action on behalf of the organization. Additionally, organizations 
that elect their leaders may have a natural affinity with democratically 
elected state representatives. These similarities may lead to greater con-
tact between CSOs with elected leaders and the state than between CSOs 
with appointed leaders and the state. Similarly, elected CSO leaders may 
be ambitious and interested in using their positions to network with 
public officials, gain experience with the state, and/or expand their ca-
reer opportunities. Finally, internal CSO elections allow ordinary partici-
pants to hold their leaders accountable, as candidates for CSO leadership 
positions must demonstrate their engagement in a variety of policy ven-
ues – possibly beyond protest activities. 
To test these hypotheses, we use a dichotomous variable to deter-
mine whether CSOs elect their leaders (coded 1; accounts for 14 percent) 
or appoint their leaders (coded 0; accounts for 86 percent). 
4.7 Contact with Other State Entities 
We anticipate that CSOs inclined to work with one state entity will have 
a greater chance of contacting and attempting to work with another state 
entity. This may occur if a CSO’s initial state contact does not produce 
the expected outcomes, thus leading the CSO to solicit help from anoth-
er state entity or patron. The CSO could also pursue contacts with mul-
tiple state entities at once to generate better outcomes as a client or 
simply because the first state entity is not able to resolve a CSO’s prob-
lem or provide it with a service.  
We code a variable that measures the number of state entities a 
CSO reports having had contact with during the six months prior to our 
survey (not including the branch of the state for the DV in Tables 3 and 
4). The minimum amount of contact is 0 and the maximum is 5. The 
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mean number of entities with which CSOs interact is 1.57 and the stand-
ard deviation is 0.46.  
Table 3:  Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the 
State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeff. for 
Attending a 
Policy Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Attending a 
National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Contact with 
Municipal 
Chamber 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Contact with 
Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Per Capita GDP 
(Logged) 
-0.24** 
(0.00) 
-0.20** 
(0.03) 
-0.19** 
(0.02) 
-0.18** 
(0.0005) 
Mayor’s Party -0.51 
(0.29) 
-0.39 
(0.33) 
-0.44 
(0.35) 
-0.37 
(0.31) 
CSO Contract 0.68** 
(0.11) 
0.76** 
(0.08) 
0.55** 
(0.10) 
0.74** 
(0.03) 
Elected Leaders 0.10* 
(0.04) 
0.13* 
(0.05) 
0.02** 
(0.001) 
0.13** 
(0.03) 
Contact with 
Other Parts of 
the State  
0.17** 
(0.04) 
0.17** 
(0.03) 
0.19* 
(0.08) 
0.18** 
(0.04) 
Constant 1.37 
(0.74) 
2.15** 
(0.62) 
1.66 
(0.79) 
1.30* 
(0.38) 
Log Likelihood -316.49 -274.07 -288.61 -301.93 
Wald X2 (4) 163 167 164 164 
N 840 823 854 825 
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.26 0.29 0.39 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Table 4:  Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the 
State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010 (Using CSO Admin-
istrators’ Household Incomes) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeff. for 
Attending a 
Policy Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Attending a 
National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Contact with 
Municipal 
Chamber 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Contact with 
Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Administrator’s 
Household 
Income 
-0.35** 
(0.07) 
-0.27** 
(0.05) 
-0.25** 
(0.03) 
-0.37** 
(0.06) 
Mayor’s Party -0.49 
(0.29) 
-0.46 
(0.28) 
-0.45 
(0.29) 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
CSO Contract 0.59** 
(0.10) 
0.64** 
(0.06) 
0.61** 
(0.10) 
0.64** 
(0.12) 
Elected Leaders 0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.21** 
(0.03) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.13 ** 
(0.02) 
Contact with 
Other Parts of 
the State  
0.19* 
(0.08) 
0.18** 
(0.04) 
0.23** 
(0.05) 
0.21* 
(0.09) 
Constant 1.20 
(0.85) 
1.73 
(0.87) 
1.41 
(0.90) 
1.44* 
(0.67) 
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Independent 
Variables 
Coeff. for 
Attending a 
Policy Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Attending a 
National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Contact with 
Municipal 
Chamber 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Contact with 
Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Log Likelihood -308.83 -325.37 -296.48 -319.27 
Wald X2 (4) 167 168 166 160 
N 851 836 853 848 
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.27 0.26 0.31 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
4.8 Results for Formal Policy Making, Informal contact 
with state officials as Dependent Variables 
First, the results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that both formal and informal 
CSO contact with participatory democracy decreases as the city in which 
CSOs are located gets wealthier. Similarly, CSO engagement with the 
state decreases as CSO administrator household income increases. The 
direction of these relationships is consistent across model specifications 
and statistically significant in each case. The relationships hold for CSO 
contact with other branches of the state as well: the odds of CSOs hav-
ing recent contact with public officials decrease as city wealth and CSO 
administrator household income increase – in some cases, by almost 40 
percent per unit increase. This suggests that compared to CSOs from 
municipalities with a mean level of logged GDP/capita, those with 
logged GDP/capita of one standard deviation above the mean are esti-
mated to have on average up to 32 percent less contact with the state 
when holding all other variables constant at their means. This finding 
provides support for the resource mobilization argument: CSOs become 
less dependent on the state as the wealth of their community grows 
(Buechler 1993; Jenkins 1983).  
Second, the results in Tables 3 and 4 show that CSOs with elected 
leaders are more likely to have contact with participatory democracy and 
other state entities than are CSOs with appointed leaders. This is im-
portant because it suggests that CSO members expect leaders to show 
evidence of their organizations’ progress and represent members’ inter-
ests to the state. The willingness of elected CSO leaders to interact with 
the state (controlling for the CSO leaders’ SES) might reflect high expec-
tations and accountability as CSO leaders who fail to showcase their 
efforts through interaction with the state may be voted out of office. 
This is updated evidence for the “participatory publics” argument, which 
draws attention to the use of democratic practices inside of CSOs (Av-
ritzer 2002; Wampler and Avritzer 2004).  
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Third, the results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate having a contract in-
creases the likelihood of contact with the state by approximately five 
times relative to organizations without a contract. This suggests that 
contracts not only provide CSOs with payments for services but also 
create and strengthen connections between the state and civil society. 
We create an interaction term for CSO leaders’ income and for whether 
the CSO has a state contract. The results of the estimation presented in 
Table 5 show that CSOs with relatively wealthy leaders and state con-
tracts are more likely to engage with the state than are CSOs with only 
wealthy leaders.  
Table 5:  Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the 
State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010 (Using an Interac-
tion between CSO Administrators’ Household Incomes and State 
Contracts) 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeff. for 
Attending a 
Policy Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Attending a 
National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Contact with 
Municipal 
Chamber 
(SE) 
Coeff. for 
Contact with 
Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Administrator’s 
Household Income 
*Contract (Condi-
tional Coeff. for 
High Income, with 
contract) 
-0.11** 
(0.02) 
-0.18** 
(0.03) 
-0.16** 
(0.04) 
-0.20** 
(0.03) 
Administrator’s 
Income 
-0.31 
(0.22) 
-0.25 
(0.20) 
-0.46* 
(0.22) 
-0.20 
(0.18) 
CSO Contract 0.73** 
(0.18) 
0.70** 
(0.16) 
0.62** 
(0.18) 
0.87** 
(0.21) 
Mayor’s Party -0.09 
(0.13) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.17 
(0.15) 
Elected Leaders 0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
Contact with Other 
Parts of the State  
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Constant 1.58* 
(0.70) 
1.70* 
(0.74) 
1.94 
(1.36) 
1.15* 
(0.39) 
Log Likelihood -341.85 -310.50 -328.73 -274.09 
Wald X2 (4) 170 177 164 168 
N 843 839 851 851 
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.42 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
We also evaluate CSO assessments of learning following state contact 
and participation in state institutions. The results in Table 5a of the 
Technical Appendix help corroborate some of our arguments about 
wealth and CSOs’ reliance on the state. CSOs from wealthier cities and 
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with wealthier administrators are less likely to feel that attending educa-
tional workshops is beneficial than are CSOs in poorer cities and with 
poorer leaders. Thus the CSOs with potentially fewer resources have 
more contact with the state and they express satisfaction with regard to 
that contact – at least in the form of claiming to have gained beneficial 
knowledge of how government works by attending workshops. In con-
trast, CSOs with potentially more resources are, on average, less likely to 
have contact with the state and less likely to find that contact beneficial 
in terms of workshops.  
Our data reveals a general trend where CSOs in wealthier cities and 
with wealthier leaders are distant from formal politics. It appears that 
wealthier CSOs already have the resources, knowledge, and connections 
to pursue their interests without relying on the state. CSOs in wealthy 
areas and with wealthy leaders are likely to be more professionalized and 
perhaps have organizational advantages, which means that they do not 
need the state as much as CSOs in poorer cities and with poorer leaders 
do. However, the relationships we find in the data could also stem from 
state officials’ attempts to shield themselves and their agencies from 
pressure. Under this conceptual framework public officials might rea-
sonably expect CSOs with more resources to make greater demands, 
deploy greater resources, and use greater connections in government to 
pursue their interests compared to CSOs with relatively fewer options. 
Interactions with well-resourced CSOs may therefore present public 
officials with more political trouble than benefits.  
5 Forms of Participation: What Explains  
Public Protests? 
Finally, we assess what drives CSOs to participate in public demonstra-
tions. Public demonstrations represent a visible but blunt form of politi-
cal participation. Mass protest can also potentially have an outsize impact 
relative to its cost due to the high visibility of demonstrations and the 
large voting blocs the poor represent in Brazil, where other forms of 
participation are relatively closed to poorer citizens.  
5.1 Dependent Variable: CSO Participation in Protests 
We collect data on whether CSOs organized or participated in a public 
demonstration in the previous six months. The variable is coded 1 if 
such participation occurred in the six months prior to the survey (42 
percent of CSOs) and 0 if it did not (58 percent of CSOs) did not. We 
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specify two additional models to identify the determinants of protest 
participation among CSOs. 
5.2 Key Independent Variable: Wealth of Cities and 
CSO Administrators 
Citizens and CSOs in poorer cities are likely to rely on the state more 
than CSOs in wealthier cities. As a result, politicians may be vulnerable 
to public pressure because their ability to retain office in these cities 
often depends on maintaining majority support of the poor – the largest 
group of Brazilian voters. CSOs in poorer cities or communities will 
therefore be more likely to use public protest to participate and to put 
political pressure on the state than CSOs in wealthier cities and commu-
nities. However, CSOs in poor cities, whose leaders have low SES, may 
protest because they lack other means to express their grievances, not 
necessarily because they are more dependent on public services. Our 
point here is that much like with CSO-state interaction above, more 
professional CSOs have different ways of engaging public officials and 
do not need to use mass protest to achieve their goals. 
Table 6:  Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Participation in 
Protests in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010 
Independent Variables Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) 
Per Capita GDP (Logged) -0.46** 
(0.01)  
Administrator’s Household Income  -0.22** (0.01) 
Mayor’s Party 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
CSO Contract -0.12** 
(0.03) 
-0.15** 
(0.03) 
Elected Leaders 0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
Contact with the State  -0.05** 
(0.01) 
-0.09** 
(0.01) 
Constant 2.18** 
(0.36) 
2.33** 
(0.29) 
Log Likelihood -310.53 -321.78 
Wald X2 (4) 173 162 
N 839 824 
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.36 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
We find several important connections between CSOs’ characteristics 
and their likelihood of protesting. First, the probability of protesting 
decreases as city wealth and CSO leader household income increase. This 
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is similar to our finding with regard to contact with the state, in the sense 
that CSOs with access to more resources do not need to use public 
demonstrations to pursue their goals. Relatively well-resourced CSOs 
may see such protests as inefficient types of political participation and 
use them only as a last resort when its resources, knowledge base, and 
connections fail. In contrast, CSOs in poorer cities and with poorer 
leaders may have fewer options and may thus find protests attractive due 
to the attention they generate and the familiarity they have with this form 
of participation. Our results draw connections between wealth, contact 
with the state, and participation in protests. The implication is that CSOs 
in poorer cities are still using one of two strategies that have maintained 
them for decades: protest or clientelism (Roniger 2004). These organiza-
tions have not abandoned political contestation, because it remains a 
viable means for them to pressure the state and because the new demo-
cratic institutions may not be working as well as they should be. 
Second, we find that CSOs with contracts are less likely to protest 
than are CSOs without contracts. This provides added support for the 
argument that CSOs in the poorer cities still use protest or clientelism. 
The results also suggest that civil society has undergone a process of 
professionalization and that the state has possibly co-opted CSOs 
through the offer contracts, as CSOs with contracts are engaged in par-
ticipatory democratic institutions, not street protests.  
The government contract and wealth variables let us assess whether 
wealth, professionalization, or co-optation drives CSO strategies with 
regard to political participation. We interact CSO administrator house-
hold income with CSO contract to determine whether wealthy CSOs 
with contracts are less likely to protest than (i) CSOs with poor leaders 
and contracts, (ii) CSOs with poor leaders but without contracts, (iii) or 
CSOs with wealthy leaders but without contracts. The model below 
allows us to generate estimates for different configurations of CSO ad-
ministrator household income and CSO contracts.  
CSOs with relatively wealthy leaders and contracts are less likely to 
protest than (i) CSOs with poor leaders and contracts, (ii) CSOs with 
wealthy leaders but without contracts, and (iii) CSOs with poor leaders 
but without contracts. This provides some evidence of professionaliza-
tion, rather than of co-optation in terms of contracts, likely CSO re-
sources, and participation in protests. CSOs whose administrators have 
household incomes one standard deviation above the mean and who 
have state contracts are the least likely to have attended a protest, all else 
being equal. 
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Table 7:  Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven 
Brazilian Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010) 
Independent 
Variables  
Uncond. 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
High 
Income, 
Contract 
High 
Income, 
No Con-
tract 
Low 
Income, 
Contract 
Low 
Income, 
No Con-
tract 
Contract*Ad-
ministrator’s 
Household In-
come (logged) 
-0.76 ** 
(0.10) 
-0.84** 
(0.05)  
-0.65** 
(0.03)  
Administrator’s 
Household In-
come (logged) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Mayor’s Party 0.09 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
CSO Contract 0.05 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
Contact with the 
State 
0.10  
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.06* 
(0.02) 
Elected Leaders 0.21  
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.09* 
(0.04) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.25* 
(0.10) 
Constant 1.07 **  
(0.22) 
0.51 
(0.55) 
1.45* 
(0.63) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
1.59* 
(0.51) 
Log Likelihood -285.30 -271.06 -254.93 -307.21 -312.75 
Wald X2 (4) 154 133 147 149 169 
N 817 143 215 120 339 
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.45 0.34 0.32 0.51 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
CSOs whose administrators’ incomes are one standard deviation above 
the mean but do not have state contracts are the next least likely to have 
attended a protest. CSOs with relatively poor administrators but that 
have contracts are the next least likely to protest, which is a 16 percent 
lower probability than the CSOs most likely to protest – those without 
contracts and with relatively poor administrators. The diminished likeli-
hood of political protest by poorer CSOs with contracts suggests that 
state co-optation may also be present in Brazil’s new participatory envi-
ronment. 
6 Robustness Checks 
We perform a series of robustness checks to assess the stability of our 
results and thoroughly test our hypotheses.8 First, we create new interac-
tion terms to assess whether the mayor’s party exerts a different level of 
influence on relatively wealthy CSOs compared to relatively poor CSOs. 
8  These models are available in the Technical Appendix.  
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None of these interaction terms have a statistical impact on CSOs’ inter-
action with the state or the likelihood of CSOs participating in a protest. 
We also assess whether a left-leaning council majority influences the 
behavior of CSOs by coding a variable to indicate a left-leaning council 
majority relative to a non-left-leaning council majority – again with no 
results. This implies the mayor’s party has little impact on CSO behavior 
in our sample – no matter how we construct the variables in our models. 
We also use CSO administrator education levels as a proxy for CSO 
memberships’ relative education and wealth to check our primary mod-
els’ measures. CSOs’ frequency of state contact and protest decrease as 
the respondent’s education increases. Our results for all models thus 
remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset. 
Finally, the low correlations among the independent variables in Table 8 
of the Technical Appendix suggest there are no concerns about multicol-
linearity in our models.9  
7 Conclusions 
This article captures how Brazil’s recent political reforms frame the in-
teractions between the state and civil society. The extension of civil liber-
ties protection under representative democracy, the establishment of 
participatory institutions, and the growth of state services provided by 
CSOs all influence how Brazilian CSOs engage with the state. Our re-
sults reflect politics throughout Latin America, where civil society organ-
ization has expanded among poor and middle-class communities (Ox-
horn 2011; Schönwälder 2010). Democratization, institutional reform, 
and the growth of the middle class offers CSOs new opportunities to 
pursue their interests in ways distinct from earlier civil society mobiliza-
tions under authoritarian governments (Fox 1996; Rueschemeyer, Huber 
Stephens, and Stephens 1992). In this case, Brazilian civil society has 
been “thickening” over the last 20 years as it has been in many other 
middle-income Latin American democracies, such as Argentina (Fried-
man and Hochstetler 2002), Chile (Oxhorn 1995), Colombia (Romero 
2002; Hurtado, Kawachi, and Sudarsky 2011), Costa Rica (Carneiro, 
Matos, and Husted 2015), Mexico (Haynes 2013), and Uruguay (Burt, 
Amilivia, and Lessa 2013). CSOs in these countries now have new op-
portunities, which are also likely conditioned by their particular represen-
tational environment – as Friedman and Hochstetler found in their 
comparison of Brazil and Argentina (2002).  
9  Our variables’ variance inflation factors (VIFs) are all under 5 as well. 
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Our empirical findings suggest that in Brazil CSOs in poor cities 
and those in wealthy cities but with low-income leaders pursue a combi-
nation of direct contact with public officials, participatory democracy, 
and contentious demonstrations. CSOs from relatively poor cities and 
with relatively poor leaders engage with the state at greater rates than 
CSOs in relatively rich areas and with richer leaders even though conven-
tional wisdom suggests they would not do so (White 1999; Lavalle, 
Acharya, and Houtzager 2005). This set of results reflects scholarship on 
contentious politics in a new moment, where the state is newly and heav-
ily involved in the political life of the poor (Tarrow 1998). Direct in-
volvement in new democratic institutions does not decrease the likeli-
hood of direct action (protests and contentious activities). Rather, it 
relies on government contracts (outsourcing), which has the larger effect 
of decreasing CSOs’ likelihood of using protest as a political strategy. 
Our results also suggest that CSOs in wealthier cities and with 
wealthier leaders are evolving into third-sector organizations that provide 
services or distance themselves from the state as private financial re-
sources become more prevalent through economic growth. This finding 
illuminates the importance of opportunities within Brazil’s neodevelop-
mentalist state, which leads middle-class CSO participants to use their 
expert knowledge and technical skills to engage public officials in new 
ways rather than resorting to contentious politics. CSOs in poorer com-
munities are not necessarily abandoning clientelism or contentious poli-
tics, but they are moving beyond a narrow set of choices in order to 
pursue their interests. Although the state has expanded and engages with 
the poor in some areas, the poor continue to seek the state out to make 
their voice heard and gain voting power at the same time.  
Finally, these results support scholarship on the reconfiguration of 
civil society in Latin America following democratization (Brysk 2000; 
Booth and Richard 1998; Wampler and Avritzer 2004). New repertories 
of political action are now available to CSOs, including involvement in 
party politics, campaigns and elections, incremental policy making, con-
tentious politics, and economic boycotts, inter alia. Opportunities to 
engage in collective action are more readily available in the current dem-
ocratic environment, especially in comparison to the extreme difficulties 
experienced under military dictatorships. New challenges for collective 
action correspond to the broad diversity of activities CSOs find neces-
sary to achieve their goals. For instance, CSOs must mobilize citizens, 
engage in incremental policy making, work on campaigns and elections 
(but not get too close to party officials), and develop broader social and 
policy networks. Achieving these goals has gained relevance in recent 
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decades as CSOs build stronger connections between democratic states 
and society. Understanding how and why CSOs build these connections 
is thus critical to understanding how democracy works – particularly at 
the local level. We argue that Brazilian CSO strategies depend on the 
interaction between a political community’s wealth, the protection of 
basic civil liberties, the proliferation of new democratic institutions, and 
the outsourcing of state contracts. In this respect, our research describes 
and explains important connections between Brazilian democracy and 
civil society. It also provides a framework for exploring these connec-
tions elsewhere in Latin America and, potentially, around the world.  
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Contratante, contestando, e cooptação: Estratégias de Organiza-
ções da Sociedade Civil sob novos regimes institucionais 
Resumo: A sociedade civil aumentou nos últimos 30 anos na América 
Latina num processo paralelo a construção das regimes democráticas. As 
organizações da sociedade civil (OSCs) são, frequentemente, colocados 
como uma opção para promover as melhorias na governança, na contro-
le social e na aumenta do capital social. Mas, temos um conhecimento 
limitado sobre o que motiva as estratégias políticas das OSCs, que inclu-
em a participação em instituições políticas formais, atendendo manifesta-
ções, e prestação de serviços. Neste artigo, nós estamos contribuindo ao 
conhecimento sobre sociedade civil baseado numa pesquisa de novecen-
tos OSCs em sete cidades brasileiras. No artigo, nos mostramos vários 
processos paralelos: As OSCs mais pobres continuam a participar ativa-
mente em varios processos políticos, incluindo as instituições participati-
vas, as campanhas eleitoras e na politica de protestas portanto, Também 
argumentamos que a retirada das OSC relativamente ricas reflete uma 
maior mobilização de recursos, mais profissionalização, e um aumento 
do capital social que e’ independente das novas instituições participati-
vas. Nossos resultados mostram que as explicações de várias camadas 
melhoram a nossa compreensão do comportamento das OSCs e estado-
sociedade relações no Brasil e na América Latina. 
Palavras chaves: Brasil, a sociedade civil, a participação, os movimentos 
sociais, a reforma institucional, a democratização 
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Technical Appendix  
Table 3a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in 
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. This table presents the Odds Ratios for each 
dependent variable.
Independent 
Variables 
Odds Ratio for 
Attending a 
Policy Council 
Meeting 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Munici-
pal Chamber 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Per Capita GDP 
(Logged) 
0.78** 
(0.00) 
0.81** 
(0.03) 
0.92** 
(0.02) 
0.91** 
(0.0005) 
Mayor’s Party 0.56 
(0.29) 
0.74 
(0.33) 
0.62 
(0.35) 
0.74 
(0.31) 
CSO Contract 5.15** 
(0.68) 
6.24** 
(0.33) 
4.23** 
(0.59) 
6.10** 
(0.47) 
Elected Leaders 1.07** 
(0.11) 
1.15* 
(0.08) 
1.001** 
(0.10) 
1.14** 
(0.03) 
Contact with 
Other Parts of 
the State  
1.28** 
(0.04) 
1.28** 
(0.03) 
1.36* 
(0.08) 
1.24** 
(0.04) 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
PT mayors may privilege the expansion of civil society relative to mayors from other 
parties and may therefore encourage CSO-state interaction and promote CSO con-
tracts among wealthy and poor CSOs. We want to know if CSOs in relatively wealthy 
cities with PT mayors have more interaction with the state than under other political 
circumstances. Similarly, we want to know if CSOs in relatively poor cities protest 
less when the mayor is from the PT (and thus potentially supports pro-poor policies) 
than when there is a non-PT mayor in office. Table 3a.1 presents the results of esti-
mation using these variables. 
Table 3a.1: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in 
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. This table presents the results of adding an 
interaction term to Model 1 to determine whether PT mayors in wealthy municipali-
ties have more interaction with the state. We find no statistical connection between 
PT mayors interacted with city wealth and contact with the state.  
Independent 
Variables 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a City Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Munici-
pal Chamber 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Mayor’s Party* 
Administrator’s 
Income (Logged) 
1.06 
(0.22) 
1.05 
(0.21) 
0.96 
(0.30) 
1.16 
(0.31) 
Mayor’s Party 0.81 
(0.05) 
0.85 
(0.21) 
0.65 
(0.20) 
1.11 
(0.13) 
Per Capita GDP 
(Logged) 
1.34* 
(0.04) 
1.37* 
(0.15) 
1.31** 
(0.07) 
1.46* 
(0.18) 
CSO Contract 4.01** 
(0.23) 
5.16** 
(0.40) 
3.98** 
(0.77) 
5.38** 
(0.59) 
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Independent 
Variables 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a City Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Munici-
pal Chamber 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Elected Leaders 1.13* 
(0.15) 
1.10* 
(0.29) 
1.09** 
(0.19) 
1.05** 
(0.33) 
Contact with 
Other Parts of 
the State  
1.26** 
(0.16) 
1.20** 
(0.14) 
1.41* 
(0.25) 
1.27** 
(0.13) 
Constant 1.25 
(0.72) 
2.15 
(0.67) 
1.79** 
(0.24) 
1.34 
(0.51) 
Log Likelihood -283.70 -307.43 -264.36 -321.92 
Wald X2 (4) 160 168 155 159 
N 855 849 854 830 
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.31 0.39 0.34 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Table 3a.2: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in 
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. We also assess the above possibilities using a 
variable recording a left-leaning council majority vs. a non-left leaning council major-
ity. We find no statistically significant results using this variable.
Independent 
Variables 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a City Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Munici-
pal Chamber 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Council Parti-
sanship*Admin-
istrator’s House-
hold Income 
(Logged) 
1.08 
(0.21) 
1.01 
(0.21) 
0.97 
(0.25) 
1.06 
(0.18) 
Council Parti-
sanship 
0.79 
(0.25) 
0.82 
(0.36) 
0.85 
(0.34) 
0.71 
(0.30) 
Administrator’s 
Income 
1.10** 
(0.18) 
1.09* 
(0.30) 
1.10** 
(0.17) 
1.08** 
(0.21) 
CSO Contract 4.37** 
(0.48) 
6.26** 
(0.31) 
4.92* 
(0.60) 
5.68** 
(0.54) 
Elected Leaders 1.17** 
(0.20) 
1.14** 
(0.29) 
1.08** 
(0.26) 
1.19* 
(0.33) 
Contact with 
Other Parts of 
the State  
1.13** 
(0.15) 
1.12** 
(0.13) 
1.17** 
(0.05) 
1.14** 
(0.06) 
Constant 1.41 
(0.45) 
2.09 
(0.38) 
1.52 
(0.62) 
1.35 
(0.21) 
Log Likelihood -290.14 -315.29 -288.74 -303.67 
Wald X2 (4) 169 173 177 173 
N 843 850 847 852 
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.24 0.29 0.30 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 3a.3: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in 
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. We substitute the administrator’s level of 
education for their salary and use it in otherwise-identical models of CSO interaction 
with the state. Results are similar to those obtained using our primary models.  
Independent 
Variables 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a City Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Munici-
pal Chamber 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Administrator’s 
Education 
0.89** 
(0.04) 
0.84** 
(0.05) 
0.85** 
(0.05) 
0.81** 
(0.09) 
Mayor’s Party 0.55 
(0.28) 
0.72 
(0.31) 
0.67 
(0.43) 
0.68 
(0.35) 
CSO Contract 5.07** 
(0.65) 
5.93** 
(0.37) 
4.69** 
(0.62) 
5.85** 
(0.40) 
Elected Leaders 1.07** 
(0.29) 
1.09* 
(0.28) 
1.02** 
(0.24) 
1.08** 
(0.17) 
Contact with 
Other Parts of 
the State  
1.41** 
(0.11) 
1.26** 
(0.14) 
1.37* 
(0.35) 
1.32** 
(0.28) 
Constant 1.48 
(0.65) 
1.77 
(0.80) 
1.52 
(0.83) 
1.31 
(0.47) 
Log Likelihood -296.91 -322.15 -313.02 -326.57 
Wald X2 (4) 160 166 161 162 
N 851 830 836 833 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.22 0.31 0.30 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Table 3a.4: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in 
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. Our results for all models remain broadly 
similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset. This table presents the 
results of estimation without professional CSOs in the dataset.  
Independent 
Variables 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a City Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Munici-
pal Chamber 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Per Capita GDP 
(Logged) 
0.83** 
(0.05) 
0.82** 
(0.01) 
0.85** 
(0.07) 
0.81** 
(0.03) 
Mayor’s Party 0.64 
(0.27) 
0.57 
(0.36) 
0.63 
(0.47) 
0.60 
(0.35) 
CSO Contract 4.55** 
(0.46) 
6.13** 
(0.31) 
4.75** 
(0.69) 
5.81** 
(0.27) 
Elected Leaders 1.16** 
(0.31) 
1.10* 
(0.31) 
1.13** 
(0.24) 
1.03** 
(0.34) 
Contact with 
Other Parts of 
the State  
1.21** 
(0.09) 
1.23** 
(0.15) 
1.41* 
(0.20) 
1.45** 
(0.12) 
Constant 1.42 
(0.78) 
1.91 
(0.32)* 
1.47 
(0.44) 
1.25 
(0.58) 
Log Likelihood -301.83 -310.53 -327.04 -315.49 
Wald X2 (4) 169 179 173 172 
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Independent 
Variables 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a City Coun-
cil Meeting 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Munici-
pal Chamber 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
N 693 687 661 682 
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.30 0.41 0.32 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Table 4a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in 
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010(Using CSO administrators’ household in-
comes). This table presents the odds ratios for each dependent variable.  
Independent 
Variables 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a Policy 
Council 
Meeting 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Munici-
pal Chamber 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Administrator’s 
Household 
Income 
0.69** 
(0.07) 
0.75** 
(0.05) 
0.71** 
(0.03) 
0.64** 
(0.06) 
Mayor’s Party 0.60 
(0.29) 
0.56 
(0.28) 
0.53 
(0.29) 
0.80 
(0.18) 
CSO Contract 4.67** 
(0.10) 
5.02** 
(0.06) 
4.86** 
(0.10) 
5.06** 
(0.12) 
Elected Leaders 1.02** 
(0.01) 
1.10** 
(0.03) 
1.03** 
(0.01) 
1.09** 
(0.02) 
Contact with 
Other Parts of 
the State  
0.10** 
(0.08) 
1.16** 
(0.04) 
1.19** 
(0.05) 
1.16* 
(0.09) 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.
Table 4a.1: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian 
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). This table presents the results of 
adding an interaction term to Model 3 to determine whether PT mayors in poorer 
municipalities use protest less because they have an affinity with the PT at the 
national level. We find no statistical connection between PT mayors interacted with 
city wealth and the use of protest. 
Independent Variables Odds Ratio (SE) 
Mayor’s Party*Administrator’s Household Income 
(logged) 
0.91 
(0.33) 
Administrator’s Household Income (logged)  1.07 
(0.30) 
Mayor’s Party 1.06 
(0.39) 
CSO Contract 0.97 
(0.48) 
Contact with the State 1.01 
(0.55) 
Elected Leaders 1.17 
(0.32) 
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Independent Variables Odds Ratio (SE) 
Constant 2.00** 
(0.26) 
Log Likelihood -331.28 
Wald X2 (4) 165 
N 827 
Pseudo R2 0.38 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Table 4a.2: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian 
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). We also assess the above possi-
bilities using a variable recording a left-leaning council majority vs. a non-left leaning 
council majority. We find no statistically significant results using this variable. 
Independent Variables Odds Ratio (SE) 
Council Partisanship*Administrator’s Household Income 
(logged) 
0.92 
(0.39) 
Administrator’s Household Income (logged) 1.06 
(0.44) 
Council’s Partisanship 1.08 
(0.42) 
CSO Contract 1.07 
(0.54) 
Contact with the State 1.03 
(0.52) 
Elected Leaders 1.12 
(0.36) 
Constant 2.15** 
(0.27) 
Log Likelihood -320.63 
Wald X2 (4) 164 
N 835 
Pseudo R2 0.32 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Table 4a.3: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian 
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). We substitute the administrator’s 
level of education for their salary and use it in otherwise-identical models of CSO 
interaction with the state. Results are similar to those obtained using our primary 
models.
Independent Variables Odds Ratio (SE) 
Contract*Administrator’s Education 0.95* 
(0.21) 
Administrator’s Household Income (logged) 0.93 
(0.34) 
Mayor’s Party 1.20 
(0.54) 
CSO Contract 0.95 
(0.42) 
Contact with the State 0.91* 
(0.25) 
Elected Leaders 1.19* 
(0.12) 
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Independent Variables Odds Ratio (SE) 
Constant 1.54** 
(0.13) 
Log Likelihood -321.37 
Wald X2 (4) 157 
N 843 
Pseudo R2 0.32 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
One might reasonably believe these professional organizations with mostly salaried 
employees are distinct from volunteer organization in terms of their resources, con-
nections and professionalism. We have no quarrel with the general argument on this 
count and we remove the professional organizations from the dataset to determine if 
the results of estimation change in their absence. We find the results, presented in the 
technical appendix, are similar without the professional organizations, indicating 
there are no systematic differences between professional and non-professional CSOs 
in our dataset. Our results also remain broadly similar when any one city is removed 
from the dataset providing evidence the results are not driven by one particular 
Brazilian municipality. 
We also want to know what explains whether CSOs value their interaction with 
the state and pursue external opportunities for training in support of their mission. 
We collected data on whether CSOs report learning valuable information or improv-
ing their understanding of how government works from attending workshops, con-
ferences or meetings with state officials. We believe wealthier CSOs have relatively 
more professional experience and knowledge of how to pursue their organizations’ 
missions than poorer CSOs. Thus, these wealthy CSOs may not feel like they learn a 
lot from their contact with the state or their attendance of workshops, conferences, 
etc. because they already have this information. The perceived educational value of 
interacting with the state provides another opportunity for us to assess why CSOs 
pursue particular strategies of participation and forms of interaction. We therefore 
specify a second broad model to explain the determinants of CSO learning.  
The dependent variable reflects CSO administrators’ assessments of how much 
they learned about government through attendance of state-supported education-
al/information workshops forums. These workshops take on different forms, but 
they most often offer a combination of a political history of the new policymaking 
venues and basic policymaking information. The sessions are typically geared toward 
individuals with high school or less education in order to help them gain the neces-
sary knowledge to better engage incremental policymaking processes. It is coded “0” 
if the respondent did not believe attending educational meetings increased 
knowledge of how government works or how best to pursue their groups’ interests 
and “1” if attendance increased knowledge in these areas. 19% of respondents be-
lieved attendance did not increase knowledge while 81% believed it did.  
Model 2. CSO Learning from Participation= 0 + 1 (The CSO Adminis-
trator’s Salary (logged))+ 2 (The Mayor’s Party)+ 3 (CSO on Contract) 
+ 4 (CSO Elected Leaders)+ 5 (Contact with other State Entities) + 
Key Independent Variable: The CSO Administrator’s Household Income 
We believe CSOs from wealthier communities will be less likely to report beneficial 
educational experiences from attending workshops for the same reasons relatively 
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wealthy CSO administrator’s will have less contact with the state. These relatively 
wealthy, professional, knowledgeable organizations have the resources, connections 
and education to use the state. They may report relatively small knowledge gains 
from the workshops because they already have more of the information to begin 
with, thus making attending workshops a less productive experience. Table 5a pre-
sents the results of estimation using CSO learning as the dependent variable.  
Table 5a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in 
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010(Using an interaction between CSO administra-
tors’ household incomes and State Contracts). This table presents the odds ratios 
for each dependent variable. 
Independent 
Variables 
Odds Ratio for 
Attending a 
Policy Council 
Meeting 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Attending 
a National 
Conference 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Munici-
pal Chamber 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
for Contact 
with Mayor’s 
Cabinet 
(SE) 
Administrator’s 
Household In-
come*Contract 
0.94** 
(0.02) 
0.87** 
(0.03) 
0.90** 
(0.04) 
0.84** 
(0.03) 
Administrator’s 
Income 
0.77 
(0.22) 
0.81 
(0.20) 
0.69 
(0.22) 
0.70 
(0.18) 
CSO Contract 2.23** 
(0.18) 
2.57** 
(0.16) 
2.10** 
(0.18) 
3.42** 
(0.21) 
Mayor’s Party 0.94 
(0.13) 
0.91 
(0.10) 
0.94 
(0.10) 
0.83 
(0.15) 
Elected Lead-
ers 
1.03** 
(0.02) 
1.03** 
(0.02) 
1.01** 
(0.01) 
1.05** 
(0.02) 
Contact with 
Other Parts of 
the State  
1.02 
(0.02) 
0.93 
(0.04) 
0.96 
(0.02) 
1.05 
(0.01) 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Table 5a.1: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian 
Municipalities Learned “Valuable Information” from interaction with the State (2010)
Independent Variables Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) 
Per Capita GDP (Logged) 0.87** 
(0.05) 
 
Administrator’s Household Income   0.76** 
(0.08) 
Mayor’s Party 1.003 
(0.61) 
1.005 
(0.50) 
CSO Contract 1.03** 
(0.03) 
1.05** 
(0.03) 
Had Contact with Other Parts of the 
State  
1.06** 
(0.02) 
1.12* 
(0.13) 
Constant 1.51** 
(0.09) 
1.23** 
(0.06) 
Log Likelihood -290.85 -294.37 
Wald X2 (4) 163 150 
N 819 792 
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.26 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 6a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Participation in Protests in 
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. This table presents the odds ratios for each 
variable.
Independent Variables Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) 
Per Capita GDP (Logged) 0.75** 
(0.01) 
 
Administrator’s Household Income  0.68** 
(0.01) 
Mayor’s Party 1.01 
(0.05) 
1.01 
(0.05) 
CSO Contract 0.95** 
(0.03) 
0.92** 
(0.03) 
Elected Leaders 1.07* 
(0.05) 
1.03* 
(0.03) 
Contact with the State  0.98** 
(0.01) 
0.95** 
(0.01) 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Table 6b: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian 
Municipalities Learned “Valuable Information” from interaction with the State (2010). 
Our results for all models remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs 
in the dataset. This table presents the results of estimation without professional 
CSOs in the dataset. 
Independent Variables Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) 
Per Capita GDP (Logged) 0.85** 
(0.12) 
 
Administrator’s Household Income   0.89** 
(0.06) 
Mayor’s Party 1.08 
(0.57) 
1.04 
(0.49) 
CSO Contract 1.09* 
(0.05) 
1.07* 
(0.13) 
Had Contact with Other Parts of the 
State  
1.14** 
(0.08) 
1.10* 
(0.12) 
Constant 1.58** 
(0.06) 
1.30** 
(0.04) 
Log Likelihood -284.35 -293.12 
Wald X2 (4) 142 163 
N 608 599 
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.25 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 7a: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian 
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). This table presents the odds ratio 
for attending or organizing protests. 
Independent 
Variables 
Odds 
Ratio (SE)
Odds 
Ratio (SE)
Odds 
Ratio (SE)
Odds 
Ratio (SE)
Odds 
Ratio (SE) 
Contract*Ad-
ministrator’s 
Household 
Income (logged) 
0.73** 
(0.10) 
0.62** 
(0.05)  
0.85** 
(0.03)  
Administrator’s 
Household 
Income (logged) 
0.97 
(0.05) 
0.95 
(0.04) 
0.94 
(0.05) 
0.95 
(0.04) 
0.98 
(0.04) 
Mayor’s Party 1.05 
(0.08) 
1.06 
(0.07) 
0.97* 
(0.02) 
1.02 
(0.05) 
1.04* 
(0.03) 
CSO Contract 1.03 
(0.03) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
0.99 
(0.04) 
0.97 
(0.04) 
0.98 
(0.03) 
Contact with the 
State 
1.04 
(0.06) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
0.96* 
(0.04) 
1.06 
(0.08) 
0.91* 
(0.02) 
Elected Leaders 1.10 
(0.15) 
1.07 
(0.14) 
1.05* 
(0.04) 
0.98* 
(0.02) 
1.18* 
(0.10) 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Table 7a.4: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian 
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). Finally, our results for all models 
remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset. This table 
presents the results of estimation without professional CSOs in the dataset. 
Independent Variables Odds Ratio (SE) 
Contract*Administrator’s Household Income 
(logged) 
0.88** 
(0.06) 
Administrator’s Household Income (logged) 0.93 
(0.53) 
Mayor’s Party 1.08 
(0.45) 
CSO Contract 1.02 
(0.56) 
Contact with the State 1.07 
(0.55) 
Elected Leaders 1.14* 
(0.26) 
Constant 2.17** 
(0.14) 
Log Likelihood -308.34 
Wald X2 (4) 176 
N 625 
Pseudo R2 0.32 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 8: Correlation Chart of Independent Variables in Tables I, II, III, IV and V 
 City 
GDP 
Admin 
Salary 
Mayor’s 
Party 
Contract Elected 
Leaders 
Contact 
with 
State 
City GDP 1.00      
Admin 
salary 0.17 1.00     
Mayor’s 
Party 0.11 0.06 1.00    
Contract 0.22 0.29 0.26 1.00   
Elected 
Leaders 0.21 0.13 -0.02 0.09 1.00  
Contact 
with the 
State 
-0.20 -0.17 0.18 0.31 0.24 1.00 
 
